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Abstract 
The 2020 Covid-19 pandemic may not be a game changer for future peacekeeping and 
humanitarian operations, but it is likely to strengthen developments that have been on-going 
since the early 2010s. Since then, major global and regional powers have increasingly pursued 
self-interested policies, interventions have become less accepted by host countries, and the UN 
is more financially constrained. These developments all point towards fewer and smaller 
interventions. Responses to Covid-19 so far suggest these trends to continue. Arguably, this 
hampers effective and collaborative action against global challenges such as Covid-19.    
 
Introduction 
Covid-19 already has had an enormous impact endangering the lives and livelihoods of many 
people around the world. Especially for people caught up in conflict and often living in 
cramped and unsanitary conditions in refugee sites, Covid-19 poses enormous risks. Will the 
Covid-19 pandemic also decisively alter peacekeeping, peacebuilding and even more generally 
humanitarian engagement? Will it provide a fatal blow for Peaceland1 or will it re-energize the 
international community to support the most vulnerable? It is indeed tempting to identify 2020 
as a breakpoint with notably less political and humanitarian engagement and peacekeeping in 
the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. However, I will argue that the reversal already took place 
prior to 2020. The NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, the Russian intervention in the Ukraine 
and Syria in 2015, and the 2016 election of Trump as US president were all more important 
moments in the decline of UN peacekeeping and -building. The Covid-19 pandemic is prone 
to strengthen these developments and, if as expected the pandemic eventually strikes across 
Latin America, Africa and Asia, a lackluster multilateral response will aggravate its impact. 
 
The end of the Cold War not only marked an expansion in peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
interventions, but also changed their nature: peacekeepers were deployed to civil wars and 
humanitarian emergencies with robust protection of civilians as a central element of their 
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mandates. Whereas initially there was little change in the main contributors, mainly European 
and South-Asian countries, over time the group of contributing countries expanded 
considerably with regional countries replacing European ones and China emerging as a 
significant contributor. Although the failures and shortcomings of peacekeeping have been 
documented extensively (Paris 2004; Autesserre 2010; 2014), there is an emerging consensus 
that peacekeeping has supported peace agreements and contributed to reducing violence 
(Fortna 2008; Hultman, Kathman and Shannon 2013; Dorussen 2014; Ruggeri, Dorussen and 
Gizelis 2017). All in all, the ledger seems to be positive, but notwithstanding its achievements, 
peacekeeping appears to have hit rough times.  
 
The remainder highlights three main challenges and discusses how the limited global response 
to the Covid-19 crisis illustrates their gravity. First of all, powerful political leaders 
increasingly view problems from a nationalist perspective and have become unwilling or 
unable to collaborate. Secondly, there is not only a reluctance to act, but host countries 
increasingly distrust interventions and see them as attacks on national autonomy. Finally, UN 
agencies lack resources to maintain large-scale interventions and are looking for cheaper 
alternatives. So far, Covid-19 seems to strengthen these trends rather than to lead to a 
recognition that things could be handled better differently. I consider the future of 
peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions in light of my own evaluations of previous 
interventions, in particular, the UN peacekeeping missions to Timor-Leste and Haiti. In these 
countries, the UN responded decisively – although definitely with important failings – to 
unfolding humanitarian crises as the result of conflict and natural disasters. How feasible will 
it be for the UN to respond similarly in the future? 
 
Every man for himself and the Devil take the hindmost 
The consensus among the main powers, that they share a collective responsibility to maintain 
global peace and stability, has broken down step-by-step since 2010. Conflicts are once again 
viewed through the lens of global political competition with the main powers, in particular the 
USA and Russia, regularly backing opposing factions. Rather than supporting multinational 
peacekeeping operations, countries prefer to intervene militarily, either directly or via proxies, 
and aim to change the situation on the ground by forcing a military solution. It is easy to find 
examples, such as the USA, UK and France intervening in Libya in 2011, Russia and Turkey 
in Syria since 2015 and in Libya in 2020. In contrast, peacekeeping generally aims at stabilizing 
stalemated conflicts in order to create space for a political solution. Even countries that remain 
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more committed to multilateralism, like the UK, France and other EU member states, often 
deploy their forces alongside UN peacekeeping missions rather than taking part in them; e.g., 
the French operations Serval in Mali and Sangaris in the Central African Republic (CAR) 
(Howard 2019). Regional ‘hegemons’ like Ethiopia and Rwanda have become major 
contributors to UN peacekeeping in Africa2, while the contributions of China to these missions 
reflect its increased political and economic interests in Africa.  
 
The willingness of the UN to mandate new peacekeeping missions has decreased markedly. 
Between 2001 and 2010, 11 new missions were mandated, but since then only six. The last 
large missions in South Sudan, Mali, and the CAR started in 2011, 2013 and 2014 respectively. 
Between December 2015 and 2020, the number of peacekeepers deployed decreased from 
107,088 to 83,331; a decline of 22%. The UN has also closed a number of large ambitious 
missions; e.g., Timor-Leste in 2012, Haiti and Côte d’Ivoire in 2017, and Liberia in 2018. The 
declining support for multilateralism also shows in the more limited goals of recent missions.3 
There is no longer a consensus around liberal peacekeeping – where admittedly this consensus 
was always rather minimal and skin deep – and peacekeeping is now mainly pursued to avoid 
humanitarian disasters, to counter the threat of (jihadist) terrorism, or to secure regional 
influence. On-going peacekeeping missions in Mali, CAR, South Sudan, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC), and Somalia are all motivated by such concerns rather than to support the 
development of democratic, rule-of-law based governance.  
 
So far, the response to the Covid-19 pandemic does not suggest a change of hearts. In particular, 
US president Trump has questioned the usefulness of a global multilateral response and instead 
attacked the World Health Organization (WHO) for mishandling the pandemic and accused it 
of bowing to Chinese political pressure. China strongly denies these accusations, but at the 
same time failed to cooperate fully and politicized the role of the WHO in Taiwan. Calls of the 
UN Secretary General, António Guterres, for a global ceasefire to allow for humanitarian 
access to facilitate Covid-19 responses, have been largely ignored, with progress on a Security 
Council resolution blocked by the USA.4 Conflicts in Yemen, Libya and Syria have continued 
unabated in 2020 without realistic prospects for peace agreements and possible UN 
peacekeeping missions. In Syria, during the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia blocked UN relief 
agencies to fund NGOs that were delivering health services across the Iraqi border to rebel held 
areas in Syria.5 
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The ‘Republic of NGOs’6 
The reluctance of the UN Security Council to mandate new peacekeeping missions is matched 
by a reduced willingness of countries to host such missions. Fortna (2008) observes that the 
UN rarely refuses to deploy when a member state asks for a mission to be sent to its territory. 
Host country consent, however, requires that governments and armed factions engage in 
meaningful negotiations to reach a power-sharing agreement and agree it to be backed up by a 
peacekeeping mission. Yet power-sharing arrangements can be fragile; for example, in South 
Sudan, clashes between factions led by Kiir and Machar also targeted peacekeepers, leading 
the UN to change the mandate of its mission from peace- and state-building towards the 
protection of civilians, human rights monitoring and support for the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance.7  Instead of negotiating, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad relies on Russia to block 
any meaningful UN intervention and to provide direct military support allowing him to hold 
out for military victory. In Africa, political leaders are increasingly openly critical of 
interventions by the UN or even regional organizations and argue that they undermine national 
sovereignty; e.g., Weah in Liberia or Embaló in Guinea Bissau. UN interventions are now 
commonly portrayed as a form of neo-imperialism imposing Western neoliberal values and 
standards discriminatorily on African leaders. In 2019, the Burundi government relied exactly 
on such arguments to justify closing the UN Human Rights Office.  
 
Not only politicians, but also the general public has become less willing to accept peacekeeping 
missions and other interventions, in part because repeated incidences of sexual (and other forms 
of) abuse have undermined their legitimacy. In a survey that I implemented in 2013 after the 
completion of the UN peacekeeping mission in Timor-Leste, 74% of the respondents agreed 
with the statement that the UN missions should have ended earlier, while nearly 70% were 
happy that the UN peacekeepers had left because the mission had many problems. At the same 
time, nearly everybody (96%) agreed that they were ‘grateful to the UN’ (Dorussen 2015). 
 
In Haiti, the UN peacekeeping mission and international nongovernmental organizations 
(INGOs) have become especially contested. UN peacekeepers were responsible for spreading 
cholera leading to at least 9,000 deaths and up to 800,000 Haitians infected, and the initial 
reluctance of the UN to accept responsibility and compensate victims made matters even worse 
(Katz 2013). In 2018, aid workers were accused of sexual abuse and their employer (Oxfam) 
of trying to hide the events.8 In our 2019 survey of a representative sample of nearly 2000 
Haitians, we find indeed very low levels of trust in foreign organizations (Bakaki and Dorussen 
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2020). Nearly 75% of the respondents describe the UN as corrupt and 70% as arrogant. INGOs 
are seen as arrogant and/or corrupt by nearly 70% as well. Only about 6% describes the UN or 
INGOs as trustworthy. 
 
Concerns about the risks of spreading infectious diseases posed by peacekeepers and other 
outsiders are widespread. The cholera epidemic in Haiti has shown how real these risks can be, 
and understandably led to protests that occasionally turned violent.9 Yet even without clear 
reason, suspicions can lead to hostility against peacekeepers and aid works as shown in the 
Ebola epidemic in the DRC; Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) reported 300 attacks against 
Ebola health workers in 2019.10 Increased hostility towards UN peacekeepers has motivated 
some INGOs to distance themselves from peacekeeping operations (Dorussen and de Vooght 
2018).  Recognizing that Covid-19 may further hamper UN peacekeeping, UN Secretary 
General Guterres has emphasized its contributions to handling the pandemic:  
 
Our peacekeeping operations and special political missions will continue to 
be guided by four key objectives:  First, to support national authorities in their 
response to COVID-19.  Second, to protect our personnel and their capacity 
to continue critical operations.  Third, to ensure that our own personnel are 
not a contagion vector.  And fourth, to help protect vulnerable communities 
and continue to implement mission mandates. (UN Secretary General 
Guterres, 20 April 2020)11 
  
It is still too early to tell whether the UN will be able to meet these key objectives or whether 
Covid-19 will undermine the ability of the UN to continue its missions. An example of possible 
problems ahead is the decision of the government of Burundi to expel four WHO 
representatives presumably in response to their warnings against holding elections during the 
Covid-19 pandemic.12  
 
Getting by on a Shoestring 
Finally, the UN is increasingly financially constrained and finds it hard to finance the current 
number of peacekeeping missions and peacekeepers deployed. Given that the US is the largest 
financial contributor to the UN, the skepticism of the Trump administration to fund UN 
initiatives has a real impact on the UN budget. The Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) declaration 
emphasizes that member states should provide sufficient resources in line with the mandates 
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of UN peacekeeping operations.13 The UN has identified savings to its peacekeeping budget; 
in part by closing down a number of its peacekeeping missions. In Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and 
Haiti, peacekeeping missions have been replaced with smaller civilian-led political missions. 
The A4P program also emphasizes the importance of political solutions and political support 
of the member states for on-going missions.  
 
The increasing importance of political missions clearly precedes the Covid-19 pandemic. In 
our research, we have found that the number of UN diplomatic initiatives, including political 
missions and good offices engagement, has exceeded the number of UN peacekeeping missions 
since 2005 (see Figure 1). Moreover, the number of political missions has been increasing 
rapidly while the number of peacekeeping missions has decreased since 2015 (Dorussen and 
Clayton 2018, Clayton, Dorussen, and Böhmelt 2020). In 2020, there are 14 peacekeeping 
missions and 25 political missions.14 Political missions are important because they allow the 
UN to mediate political solutions to armed conflicts, e.g., in Yemen, Syria, Somalia and Libya, 
and to contribute to peacebuilding; e.g., in Haiti and Colombia. At the same time, they lack the 
reach and scope of the large multidimensional and integrated peacekeeping missions the UN 
once deployed to Timor-Leste and continues to deploy to the DRC. Multidimensional missions 
can play an important role in dealing with looming health or humanitarian crises because of 
Covid-19, whereas the options of – the much smaller – political missions will be much more 
limited. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
If anything, Covid-19 will further limit the resources available to the UN. Dealing with the 
immediate healthcare and economic costs of the crisis is already burdening the finances of 
governments (and individuals) around the world. Financing the recovery from Covid-19 will 
be extraordinarily expensive. Even though foreign aid and contributions to the UN are minor 
expenditures in government budgets, they may well become targets of cost-savings. This is 
particularly likely when support of UN agencies gets politicized, as illustrated by the decision 
of the Trump administration to terminate US membership of the WHO. 
 
Conclusions    
Covid-19 is still spreading around the world with increasingly serious humanitarian and 
economic consequences with the ultimate impact of the crisis as yet unknown. Initially, Covid-
19 mainly affected China and developed economies in Asia, Europe and North America. It is 
still unclear how serious the consequences will be for countries in Latin America, Africa and 
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South and Southeast Asia, and for obvious reasons there are real concerns about their ability to 
cope with the fallout of the pandemic. 
 
Already for a number of years, the UN has been unable to initiate large multidimensional 
peacekeeping missions while it reduced the scope of on-going missions. The necessary political 
will to support such missions in the Security Council no longer exists. Political leaders and the 
general population in (potential) host countries seem increasingly distrustful of foreign 
interventions. Finally, the UN has to deal with tight financial constraints motivating it to end 
or down-size missions whenever possible. Compared to the total amount of global military 
expenditures (estimated at $1,747 billion in 2013), the UN budget for peacekeeping ($6.51 
billion in 2019-2020)15 is very small indeed. Yet, it still allows the UN to support political 
agreements, protect civilians and secure the provision of humanitarian aid. The situation of 
civilians in conflict zones around the world remains extremely precarious; they risk getting 
caught up in military confrontations and are often under direct threat from rebel factions as 
well as government forces. Refugees and internally displaced people are often only marginally 
more secure. Now all of them also have to deal with the possibility of Covid-19 spreading 
across conflict-affected communities and refugee sites. The expected impact of Covid-19 on 
the most vulnerable justifies large-scale international support, where necessary backed up by a 
sufficiently resourced peacekeeping operation. The response to the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 
or the spread of Ebola in West Africa in 2013 demonstrates that international support and 
peacekeepers can make a difference, at least in dealing with the immediate aftermath of a crisis. 
Admittedly it is much less clear how to deal best with political crises and instability in the 
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